Measuring and decomposing firm׳s revenue and cost efficiency: The Russell measures revisited  by Aparicio, Juan et al.
Measuring and decomposing ﬁrm's revenue and cost
efﬁciency: The Russell measures revisited
Juan Aparicio a,n, Fernando Borras a, Jesus T. Pastor a, Fernando Vidal b
a Center of Operations Research (CIO). Miguel Hernandez University of Elche (UMH), 03202 Elche (Alicante), Spain
b Environmental Economics Department. Miguel Hernandez University of Elche (UMH), 03212 Orihuela (Alicante), Spain
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 21 February 2013
Accepted 12 March 2015
Available online 20 March 2015
Keywords:
Data envelopment analysis
Revenue efﬁciency
Cost efﬁciency
Slacks
Convex conjugates
a b s t r a c t
Overall inefﬁciency measurement and decomposition are important for ﬁrms facing a world of changing
prices since the resultant loss has implications on managers' decision making. In this paper, we draw
attention to some problems within existing approaches to decompose overall inefﬁciency into its
sources and propose new revenue and cost inefﬁciency measures based on the well-known Russell
measures. Speciﬁcally, the technical inefﬁciency component is calculated by the Russell output (input)
measure, which is able to incorporate all sources of inefﬁciency corresponding to the output (input) side,
speciﬁcally output (input) slacks, whereas allocative inefﬁciency is retrieved residually. All our results
are derived from a new Fenchel–Mahler inequality using the theory of convex conjugates. This paper has
several implications in theory and practice. From a theoretical point of view, we establish a natural dual
relationship between the revenue (cost) function and the Russell output (input) measure; despite the
previous unsuccessful attempts in the literature to provide such duality result. From a practical point of
view, we provide a way of decomposing revenue (cost) inefﬁciency into allocative inefﬁciency and a
component that measures technical inefﬁciency in the sense of Pareto, contrasting with the usual
approaches for decomposing revenue (cost) inefﬁciency, such as those based on Shephard's output
(input) distance function and the directional output (input) distance function.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a methodology based
fundamentally on mathematical programming for the assessment
of technical efﬁciency of a set of Decision Making Units (DMUs)
that use several inputs to produce several outputs. In standard
microeconomic theory, the economic behavior of a DMU is usually
characterized by cost minimization, revenue maximization, or
proﬁt maximization. In particular, if revenue maximization is
assumed, the DMU faces exogenously determined market output
prices, and we can assume that the objective of each DMU is to
choose the output combination that results in the maximum
revenue. In this sense, revenue inefﬁciency measures how close
the actual revenue of the evaluated DMU approaches the max-
imum feasible revenue. Additionally, in the Farrell (1957) tradi-
tion1, revenue inefﬁciency has usually been decomposed into two
components, technical inefﬁciency and allocative inefﬁciency, as a
way to understand what needs to be done to enhance the
performance of the assessed unit.
So far, two famous approaches have traditionally been used in the
literature to measure and decompose cost and revenue efﬁciency.
Chronologically, the ﬁrst one measures revenue (cost) efﬁciency as
the ratio between the optimal revenue (cost) to the actual revenue
(cost) corresponding to the assessed DMU, one of the usual economic
indexes of a ﬁrm's performance, in order to evaluate the level of lost
(saved) revenue (cost). In addition, for this ﬁrst approach, the revenue
(cost) efﬁciency is decomposed into subcomponents using Shephard's
output (input) distance function (Shephard, 1953). In particular, the
technical efﬁciency component is calculated as the reciprocal of
Shephard's output (input) distance functionwhile allocative efﬁciency
is retrieved as a residual between revenue (cost) and technical
efﬁciency. On the other hand, Shephard's output and input distance
functions are closely related to radial measures in DEA, projecting the
evaluated unit to the efﬁcient frontier of the technology through
equiproportional changes in outputs (inputs) and, consequently,
preserving the mix. Unlike Shephard's distance functions, the direc-
tional distance function introduced by Chambers et al. (1996, 1998) is
a way to make the path to the frontier followed by the assessed DMU
more ﬂexible in order to be efﬁcient. In particular, the directional
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distance function requires the speciﬁcation of a directional vector,
allowing for a ﬂexible choice of orientation in the input and output
space. This notion is also equivalent to Shephard's output distance
function when the directional output vector corresponds to the
observed output vector for the assessed DMU. Additionally, by duality,
it is possible to relate the output directional distance function to the
revenue function and establish the corresponding Fenchel–Mahler
inequality (Färe and Primont, 2006). In this case, revenue efﬁciency is
estimated as the normalized deviation between optimal revenue and
observed revenue for the evaluated unit at market prices, providing a
measure of the revenue lost by not operating in a fully efﬁcient
manner. The normalization that emerges, in a natural way, from the
application of duality theory coincides with the “value” of the
directional output vector, i.e., the sum of the product of the compo-
nents of the directional output vector with their corresponding
output prices. Nevertheless, despite the existence of manifold possi-
bilities as directional vectors (Chambers and Färe, 2008), in practice,
researchers have considered only a few. For example, one usual
selection is the vector corresponding to the observed output vector
for the evaluated DMU. However, in this case, the directional distance
function is equivalent to Shephard's output distance function, while
the approach to measure and decompose revenue efﬁciency also
coincides with the original approach introduced by Farrell (see Färe
and Primont, 2006, for more details). Accordingly, this particular
output directional distance function suffers the same weakness that
we pointed out for Shephard's distance functions associated with the
preservation of the mix. On the other hand, another alternative for the
directional output vector is to set each vector component equal to one
(Färe et al., 2005). However, this option yields an unusual deﬂator to
be used as a way to normalize the revenue efﬁciency: the normal-
ization would coincide with the sum of output market prices.
In addition, both radial measures and directional distance func-
tions neglect slacks (Ray, 2004). In particular, when the efﬁciency is
measured in an output-oriented context, the evaluated units are
projected onto the efﬁcient frontier in the output space and,
speciﬁcally, output slacks can play an important role in the evalua-
tion of technical efﬁciency. As mentioned earlier, revenue efﬁciency
has usually been decomposed in the literature into technical efﬁ-
ciency and allocative efﬁciency. However, one issue that has received
little attention in DEA is the decomposition of the gap between
optimal and actual revenue (cost) by a technical efﬁciency measure
that takes all types of technical inefﬁciencies in the corresponding
output (input) space into account. Speciﬁcally, we are referring,
depending on the selected orientation for the analysis, to the output
or input slacks of the model. However, the usual approaches to
measure revenue (cost) efﬁciency ignore the possible existence of
slacks. Consequently, the corresponding allocative component will be
incorrectly estimated as a residual since this component will reﬂect
not only the gains in revenue (cost) that can be accomplished by
substitutions along the efﬁcient frontier, but it will also account for
some type of technical inefﬁciency (the slacks).
In view of the preceding discussion, we highlight that the usual
approaches for measuring and decomposing revenue and cost
efﬁciency present weaknesses that should be resolved. In this
paper, we propose a solution for addressing these problems that is
based on the Russell measures (Färe and Lovell, 1978; and Färe
et al., 1985). All our results are derived from a new Fenchel–Mahler
inequality using the theory of convex conjugates and, conse-
quently, we prove the existence of a new dual correspondence
between the revenue (cost) function and the Russell output (input)
measure. One advantage to this approach in contrast to others is
that it resorts to the Russell measures to estimate the technical
inefﬁciency component, while allocative inefﬁciency is retrieved
residually. It guarantees that, depending on the model's chosen
orientation, all sources of technical inefﬁciency in the correspond-
ing output or input space will be taken into account, since these
models are related to the Pareto–Koopmans deﬁnition of technical
efﬁciency.
In DEA no measure satisﬁes all desirable properties for measur-
ing technical efﬁciency (see, for example, Russell and Schworm,
2009). So, practitioners must select between several “imperfect”
alternatives to assess technical efﬁciency. This point is true if the
focus is placed on treating the technical efﬁciency measures as
being completely independent from prices and concepts of eco-
nomic efﬁciency. However, Russell (1985) shows that if the
existence of a dual relationship with the cost or revenue functions
is required as an axiom, then Shephard's distance functions are the
adequate selection between all the options since they are the
natural dual to the usual measures of economic efﬁciency, and
they are also bounds of the usual measures of economic efﬁciency,
allowing the decomposition of the economic efﬁciency index. In
this case, Russell's reasoning is based on assuming that the Russell
measures do not have a dual relationship with the cost or revenue
functions. For the same reasons, Kopp (1981, p. 452) claims that
“…in terms of the economic concept of cost, F(u,x) seems superior
[to the Russell measure]”, where F(u,x) denotes the inverse of
Shephard's input distance function. Along the same line, Färe et al.
(1985, p. 142), in talking about the Russell measures, claim that “…
they do not generate a natural decomposition of overall efﬁ-
ciency.” In contrast to what is believed, we prove in this paper
that the Russell output (input) measure of technical efﬁciency is
also a natural dual precursor of the revenue (cost) function. In this
respect, a previous attempt to solve this problem was made by
Färe et al. (2007), where the original notion is modiﬁed in order to
deﬁne a “multiplicative” version of the Russell measure. To do that,
they resorted to the geometric mean as objective function instead
of the usual arithmetic mean. In this way, they are able to obtain a
decomposition of cost efﬁciency in terms of the redeﬁned Russell
measure, an allocative efﬁciency component and an unusual third
component called “the Debreu–Farrell deviation.” In our case, we
resort to the traditional deﬁnition of Russell measures, based on
the arithmetic mean, and the decomposition that we propose only
uses two terms, the Russell measure plus an allocative component.
Recently, Aparicio et al. (2013) introduced a new way to measure
and decompose revenue inefﬁciency. This approach must be high-
lighted because it also focuses on the issue of taking all sources of
technical inefﬁciency into account when overall inefﬁciency is
decomposed. Therefore, both approaches, that by Aparicio et al.
(2013) and the newmodel we introduce here, are aimed at measuring
and decomposing revenue inefﬁciency by resorting to a technical
inefﬁciency component that takes output slacks into account. How-
ever, while the Aparicio et al. (2013) approach is based on Cooper
et al. (2011), ours is founded on the well-known Russell output
measure of technical efﬁciency. In this way, and as happens with
Shephard's output distance function and the directional output
distance functions, the interpretation of the technical efﬁciency
measure used in our case is easier. Speciﬁcally, in the case of the
Russell output measure, its value can be interpreted as the average of
proportional rates of output expansion.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, existing
approaches for estimating revenue efﬁciency are outlined and,
additionally, we brieﬂy recall the deﬁnition of the Russell measures.
Section 3 shows how revenue efﬁciency can be estimated and
decomposed using the Russell measures by applying the theory of
convex conjugates. In Section 4, we illustrate the new approach
through a numerical example. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Preliminary notions
In this section, we brieﬂy review the different procedures that
can be found in the literature for measuring and decomposing
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revenue efﬁciency. To do this, we hereafter assume that the
evaluated units face exogenously determined output prices and
try to maximize their revenue. Additionally, in this section a brief
description of the Russell measures is provided.
Before brieﬂy reviewing existing literature, let us introduce
some notation. Consider that we have observed n Decision Making
Units (DMUs) that use m inputs to produce s outputs. These are
denoted by xj; yj
 
, j¼ 1; :::;n. It is assumed xj ¼ xj1; :::; xjm
 
ARmþ ,
j¼ 1; :::;n, and yj ¼ yj1; :::; yjs
 
ARsþ þ , j¼ 1; :::;n. The relative efﬁ-
ciency of each DMU0 in the sample is assessed with reference to
the so-called production possibility set T ¼ x; yð Þ ¼ x1; :::; xmð

; y1; :::; ysÞ : x can produce yg, which can be empirically constr-
ucted from n observations by assuming several postulates (see
Banker et al., 1984). If, in particular, variable returns to scale is
assumed, then T can be characterized as follows:
T ¼ x; yð ÞARmþ þ  Rsþ þ :
Xn
j ¼ 1
λjx
j
irxi; 8 i;
Xn
j ¼ 1
λjyjrZyr ; 8r;
Xn
j ¼ 1
λj
8<
:
¼ 1; λjZ0; 8 j
)
: ð1Þ
Hereafter, we assume that each DMU is interested in maximiz-
ing outputs while using the observed amount of input. This type of
approach is called output-oriented in the literature. In order to
implement this approach, introducing the output production set is
useful. In this sense, for each input vector x, let P xð Þ be the set of
feasible (producible) outputs. Formally, P xð Þ ¼ y : x; yð ÞAT .
Given a ﬁxed level of input x0 ¼ x01; :::; x0m
 
ARmþ , let us also
deﬁne as r x0; p
 
the maximum feasible revenue given the output
price vector p¼ p1; :::;ps
 
ARsþ þ :
r x0; p
 ¼ sup
y
Xs
r ¼ 1
pryr : x
0; y
 
AT
( )
¼ sup
y
Xs
r ¼ 1
pryr : yAP x
0 ( ):
ð2Þ
Next, we explicitly show how the value of the revenue function
r x0; p
 
can be calculated in DEA as in (3) (see Ray, 2004):
r x0; p
 ¼ Max
λ;y
Xs
r ¼ 1
pryr
s:t: Xn
j ¼ 1
λjx
j
irx0i ; i¼ 1; :::;m ð3:1Þ

Xn
j ¼ 1
λjyjrþyrr0; r¼ 1; :::; s ð3:2Þ
Xn
j ¼ 1
λj ¼ 1; ð3:3Þ
λjZ0; j¼ 1; :::;n ð3:4Þ
yrZ0; r¼ 1; :::; s ð3:5Þ
ð3Þ
The dual program of (3) is (4)2.
Min
cd;ψ
Xm
i ¼ 1
cix0i þψ
s:t: Xm
i ¼ 1
cixi j
Xs
r ¼ 1
dryjrþψZ0; j¼ 1; :::;n ð4:1Þ
drZpr ; r¼ 1; :::; sð4:2Þ
ciZ0; i¼ 1; :::;mð4:3Þ ð4Þ
Moreover, we can deﬁne the actual revenue for the assessed
DMU0, characterized by the input and output vector x0; y0
 
as
r0 ¼
Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r , where y0 ¼ y01; :::; y0s
 
ARsþ þ denotes the corresp-
onding output vector.
Two different approaches have usually been utilized in the
literature to evaluate economic loss due to revenue inefﬁciency. The
ﬁrst is based on the r x0; p
 
=r0 ratio. This ratio is greater than or equal
to one, and is one if and only if the unit being assessed achieves
maximum revenue, an interesting property called indication (Portela
and Thanassoulis, 2007). Moreover, r x0; p
 
=r0 can be decomposed
into a subcomponent of technical efﬁciency and a subcomponent
corresponding to allocative efﬁciency (AE) as follows: r x0; p
 
=r0 ¼
ð1=Do x0; y0
 ÞUAE; where Do x0; y0  is the output distance function
(Shephard, 1953). The output distance function coincides with the
inverse of the output-oriented CCR (Charnes–Cooper–Rhodes) model
(see Charnes et al., 1978) and the inverse of the output-oriented BCC
(Banker–Charnes–Cooper) model (see Banker et al., 1984) in a DEA
framework depending on the assumed returns to scale.
The second approach is based on the directional output
distance functions (Chambers et al., 1996, 1998), denoted as
D
!
o x0; y0; g
 
, with g¼ g1; :::; gs
 
ARsþ \ 0sf g. In this respect, Färe
and Primont (2006) proved that revenue inefﬁciency may be
decomposed into technical inefﬁciency, D
!
o x0; y0; g
 
, plus alloca-
tive inefﬁciency: r x0; p
 r0= Ps
r ¼ 1
prgr ¼ D
!
o x0; y0; g
 þAI.
Unfortunately, the two usual approaches for estimating and
decomposing revenue efﬁciency are based on measures that ignore
the possible existence of slacks associated with the projected points
on the production frontier in order to estimate technical efﬁciency
(see Ray, 2004, p. 95). As a direct consequence, the corresponding
allocative efﬁciency will be incorrectly estimated since this compo-
nent is measured as a residual related to the difference between the
revenue efﬁciency and technical efﬁciency measures. In fact, the
allocative component will reﬂect not only the gains in revenue that
can be accomplished by substitutions along the efﬁcient frontier in
the output space, but it will also account for output slacks.
In this way, themost usual and famous approaches formeasuring and
decomposing revenue efﬁciency do not guarantee achieving technical
efﬁciency in the Pareto sense in the output space, i.e., accounting for
output slacks, which should be a previous requirement for the measure-
ment of the allocative efﬁciency as a residual. In this paper, we will try to
overcome this drawback by introducing a new approach and showing
how it can be used in a numerical example. Next, we concentrate on
describing the main characteristics of the Russell measures. In particular,
we focus our work on the Russell output measure.
It is well known that technical efﬁciency measurement started
with the works of Debreu (1951), Koopmans (1951), and Shephard
(1953). Following them, Farrell (1957) implemented the ﬁrst measure
of technical efﬁciency. Later, Färe and Lovell (1978) pointed out some
limitations with this measure that motivated the development of
new approaches in order to measure technical efﬁciency. In parti-
cular, these same authors proposed a newmeasure, called the Russell
input measure of technical efﬁciency. An output-oriented version of
this notion, the Russell output measure of technical efﬁciency, was
similarly deﬁned by Färe et al. (1985). We next show the formulation
and main characteristics of this “traditional” Russell output measure
of technical efﬁciency. Nevertheless, we ﬁrst need to introduce some
additional notation.
Given x, the efﬁcient frontier of P xð Þ; also called the weak
efﬁcient frontier, is deﬁned as (see Briec, 1998):
∂ P xð Þð Þ : ¼ yAP xð Þ : y^r4yr ; r¼ 1; :::; s) y^¼ y^1; :::; y^s
 
=2P xð Þ : ð5Þ
Following Koopmans (1951), in order to measure technical
efﬁciency in the Pareto sense (in other words, taking slacks into
2 Really the dual program of model (3) has additionally the non-negativity
constraints for the decision variables dr , r¼ 1; :::; s. However, as a referee pointed
out, this set of constraints is redundant if we consider (4.2) and pr40, r¼ 1; :::; s.
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account), it is necessary to isolate a particular subset of ∂ P xð Þð Þ. We
are referring to the strong efﬁcient frontier, deﬁned below (for
more details, see Pastor and Aparicio, 2010):
∂s P xð Þð Þ : ¼ yAP xð Þ : y^Zy; y^ay) y^=2P xð Þ : ð6Þ
In words, ∂s P xð Þð Þ is the set of all the Pareto–Koopmans efﬁcient
points of P xð Þ. Throughout this paper, with the aim of measuring
technical efﬁciency, we will compare the actual performance of
each DMU0, x0; y0
 
, with respect to the points belonging to the
strong efﬁcient frontier.
We graphically illustrate both the usual geometry of the output
production set and the subsets of its frontier in Fig. 1. The bold solid line
corresponds to the strong efﬁcient frontier, consisting of two segments,
AB and BC. The weak efﬁcient frontier corresponds to the union between
the strong efﬁcient frontier and the dashed lines that appear in the ﬁgure.
Now, given a ﬁxed level of input x0, we turn to the deﬁnition of
the traditional Russell output measure of technical efﬁciency (see
Färe et al., 1985, p. 149) 3:
Ro x0; y0
 ¼Max 1
s
Xs
r ¼ 1
ϕr : ϕ1y
0
1; :::;ϕsy
0
s
 
AP x0
 
; ϕrZ1; 8r
( )
:
ð7Þ
In model (7), ϕr evaluates the relative proportional expansion rate
of output r, r¼ 1; :::; s, whereas the objective function averages these
proportional rates of output expansion. Also, in the above formulation,
the constraints ϕrZ1, r¼ 1; :::; s, are the requirements for dominance.
Model (7) can be implemented in DEA as the following linear
programming program (see Färe et al., 1985, p. 161):
Ro x0; y0
 ¼ Max
ϕ; λ
1
s
Xs
r ¼ 1
ϕr
s:t: Xn
j ¼ 1
λjx
j
irx0i ; i¼ 1; :::;m ð8:1Þ

Xn
j ¼ 1
λjyjrþϕry0rr0; r¼ 1; :::; s ð8:2Þ
Xn
j ¼ 1
λj ¼ 1; ð8:3Þ
ϕrr1; r¼ 1; :::; s ð8:4Þ
λjZ0; j¼ 1; :::;n ð8:5Þ
ð8Þ
The value of Ro x0; y0
 
can be equivalently obtained from the
dual program of (8):
Ro x0; y0
 ¼ Min
ν;μ;α;τ
Xm
i ¼ 1
νix0i þα
Xs
r ¼ 1
τr
s:t: Xm
i ¼ 1
νix
j
i
Xs
r ¼ 1
μry
j
rþαZ0; j¼ 1; :::;n ð9:1Þ
μry0r τr ¼ 1s; r¼ 1; :::; s ð9:2Þ
νiZ0; i¼ 1; :::;m ð9:3Þ
μrZ0; r¼ 1; :::; s ð9:4Þ
τrZ0; r¼ 1; :::; s ð9:5Þ
ð9Þ
As previously mentioned, the efﬁciency assessment of each
DMU0 is generally obtained as the result of its comparison with a
dominating projection point on the efﬁcient frontier of the output
production set. The coordinates of this projection will be the
targets for DMU0. Regarding the Russell output measure of
technical efﬁciency, given an optimal solution of (8), ϕn; λn
 
, the
targets are deﬁned as y0nr ¼
Pn
j ¼ 1
λnj y
j
r , r¼ 1; :::; s. The following
proposition establishes that, unlike other approaches, such as
Shephard's output distance function and the directional output
distance function, the targets generated from (8) are always
Pareto–Koopmans efﬁcient points of P x0
 
.
Proposition 1. (Färe et al., 1985). Let ϕn; λn
 
be an optimal solution
of (8). Then y0n ¼ y0n1 ; :::; y0ns
 
A∂s P x0
  
.
Before continuing, we think it is interesting to show the
properties that the traditional Russell output measure of technical
efﬁciency satisﬁes. With respect to this point, Färe and Lovell
(1978) were the ﬁrst to propose a set of desirable properties that
an ideal efﬁciency measure should meet. Later, Cooper et al. (1999)
and Pastor et al. (1999) listed similar requirements for the DEA
context and suggested some others. In particular, the main proper-
ties are (P1), the measure should be greater than or equal to one,
with one meaning full-efﬁciency; (P2), the assessed DMU0 is
Pareto–Koopmans efﬁcient if and only if the measure takes a
value of one; (P3), units invariant; and ﬁnally, (P4), strong
monotonicity. Speciﬁcally, for the output-oriented case, strong
monotonicity means that by maintaining all other inputs and
outputs constant, an increase in any of its outputs will increase the
efﬁciency score for an inefﬁcient DMU0.
Proposition 2. (Färe et al., 1985; and Pastor et al., 1999). Let
x0; y0
 
be the input and output vector corresponding to DMU0. Then,
the following is true for the Russell output measure:
(i). Ro x0; y0
 
Z1.
(ii). Ro x0; y0
 ¼ 1 if and only if y0A∂s P x0  .
(iii). Ro x0; y0
 
is units invariant.
(iv). Ro x0; y0
 
is strongly monotonic in outputs.
The Russell output measure of technical inefﬁciency is asso-
ciated with the Russell output measure of technical efﬁciency, i.e.,
RIo x0; y0
 ¼ Ro x0; y0 1: ð10Þ
Fig. 1. Illustration of the weak and strong efﬁcient frontier.
3 The deﬁnition of the Russell output measure that we use in this paper does
not allow any output of the assessed unit to be zero. Otherwise, it can be proven
that the linear program associated with this measure would be unbounded.
Nevertheless, the Russell output measure could be modiﬁed by deleting the
decision variables related to the expansion rate of each output with a zero value
for the evaluated unit. It can also be proven that, in this case, our results on duality
remain true as long as we slightly modify the revenue function. All these steps and
results are available from the authors by request.
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This measure satisﬁes the following characteristics: It is always
greater than or equal to zero, with zero signaling full-efﬁciency; it
takes a value of zero if and only if the evaluated unit is Pareto–
Koopmans efﬁcient; it is also units invariant and strongly
monotonic.
There is an important stream in the literature that has criticized
the Russell measures, e.g., Russell (1985, 1988, 1990), Bol (1986),
and Dmitruk and Koshevoy (1991), whereas other authors have
promoted the use of this approach, such as Färe and Lovell (1978),
Färe et al. (1983), and Färe et al. (1985). The pointed weaknesses of
the Russell measures are based on the properties that these
measures do not satisfy. Nevertheless, more recently, and working
on data-generated technologies (e.g., DEA), Russell and Schworm
(2009) evaluated the Debreu–Farrell measure (the inverse of
Shephard's distance function), the Russell measures, and the
Zieschang index with respect to indication, monotonicity, homo-
geneity, and continuity. Their main results state that (1) restriction
to DEA adds continuity to the set of properties satisﬁed by the
Russell measures (thus eliminating a relevant advantage of the
Debreu–Farrell measure), (2) none of the three analyzed efﬁciency
measures satisfy all the axioms and, therefore, (3) trade-offs
among the indexes remain. In particular, under DEA, the Russell
measures satisfy indication, strict monotonicity (if the origin is
excluded from the technology), and continuity, whereas the
Debreu–Farrell measure satisﬁes homogeneity and continuity.
Another related work is that by Fukuyama et al. (2014), where a
good revision of this type of literature may be found.
In view of the preceding results, the choice between the
Debreu–Farrell index and the Russell measures for DEA technol-
ogies depends on the importance of homogeneity in technologies
versus indication and monotonicity. Hence, the selection between
these measures depends upon the investigator's opinion about the
relative attractiveness of the existing traditional axioms (Russell
and Schworm, 2009). In other words, under a DEA framework, no
measure satisﬁes all desirable properties, so we must choose
between several “imperfect” alternatives in practice to assess
technical efﬁciency, one of them being the Russell measure that
we use. We speciﬁcally select this approach in this paper because
assuring Pareto–Koopmans efﬁciency is really important in our
context.
3. Measuring and decomposing revenue efﬁciency through the
Russell output measure
Duality theory has acquired great popularity in microeco-
nomics (see, for example, Varian, 1992; Cornes, 1992; Färe and
Primont, 1995; and Luenberger, 1995). Duality theory allows
stating the most common alternative ways of representing pre-
ferences and technologies, such as indirect utility and expenditure
functions, revenue and distance functions, and so on. In general,
having different ways to describe a technology seems very useful
since some types of mathematical arguments are easier to demon-
strate by using, for example, a revenue function instead of a
distance function, which is, a direct representation of the technol-
ogy (see Varian, 1992, p. 81). Both the revenue function and the
distance function are, by deﬁnition, optimization problems. Spe-
ciﬁcally, duality theory studies under which conditions these two
optimization problems are related.
As we mentioned in the previous section, under a DEA frame-
work, no measure among those existing in the literature satisﬁes
all desirable properties. In this way, researchers must select
between several imperfect alternatives in practice to assess
technical efﬁciency. However, this point is true if the focus is
placed on treating the technical efﬁciency measures as being
completely independent from prices and concepts of economic
efﬁciency (Russell, 1985). Russell (1985) shows that if the existence
of a dual relationship with the cost or revenue functions is
required as an axiom (along the same line as indication, mono-
tonicity, and homogeneity), then the Debreu–Farrell measure is
the adequate selection between all the options since: (1) It is the
natural (quantity based) dual to the usual measure of economic
efﬁciency, and (2) it is a bound of the usual measure of economic
efﬁciency (using market prices), which permits decomposing the
economic efﬁciency index. In this section, we speciﬁcally prove
that the Russell output measure of technical efﬁciency is also a
dual precursor of the revenue function and, therefore, it shares
this good property with the Debreu–Farrell measure.
Particularly, this section is devoted to proving the existing
duality relationship between the Russell output measure and the
revenue function. In this respect, we prove that the Russell output
measure of inefﬁciency in DEA can be seen as the (minus) Fenchel
conjugate of the revenue function given a speciﬁc level of inputs.
This result is completely new in DEA literature. So far, what is well
known is that both Shephard's output distance function and the
directional output distance function have dual relationships with
the ﬁrm's revenue function. Thus, we understand that if the
directional output distance function enhanced the approach pro-
posed by Farrell and Shephard, allowing more ﬂexibility in the
selected direction of the projection on the efﬁcient frontier, the
Russell output measure permits taking the output slacks into
account when technical efﬁciency is measured on the output side,
improving the existing approaches in some sense. Consequently,
the duality results we show in this section, corresponding to the
Russell output measure and the revenue function, could be of
interest for DEA researchers and practitioners. Additionally, by
applying the well-known Young–Fenchel inequality, we will be
able to show in this section how revenue inefﬁciency can be
decomposed into its usual components: technical inefﬁciency and
allocative inefﬁciency.
Before proving the main theorem of this contribution, let us
introduce one deﬁnition and two results associated with the
standard theory of convex conjugates (see Rockafellar, 1970,
pp. 102–106; and Zalinescu, 2002, pp. 75–77).
Deﬁnition 1. Let f : Z-R be a convex function. Then its Fenchel
conjugate function, f n, is deﬁned as f n znð Þ : ¼ sup 〈z; zn〉
 f zð Þ : zAZg ¼  inf f zð Þ〈z; zn〉 : zAZ .
Proposition 3 (The Young–Fenchel inequality).. Let f : Z-R be a
convex function and let f n be its associated Fenchel conjugate, then
f zð Þþ f n znð ÞZ 〈z; zn〉; 8zAZ; 8znAZn:
Proposition 4. Let f n be the Fenchel conjugate function of f . Then,
the Fenchel conjugate function of f n is f nn ¼ f .
We now focus the analysis on the revenue function. Given the
technology T and the input level x0, the revenue function r x0; p
 
in (2) is a convex function in p (see Färe and Primont, 1995). For
DMU0, with vector x0; y0
 
, let us now consider the set
Z0 ¼ pARs : min sy01p1; :::; sy0s ps
 
Z1
 
. Then, applying Deﬁnition
1, the Fenchel conjugate function of r x0;p
 
restricted to prices
that belong to Z0 would be
rn x0; y0
 ¼ sup
p
Xs
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r r x0;p
 
: pAZ0
( )
¼  inf
p
r x0; p
  Xs
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r : pAZ
0
( )
: ð11Þ
We next prove that the Russell output measure of technical
inefﬁciency RIo x0; y0
 
can be written as inf
p
r x0;p
   Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r :
pAZ0g and, therefore, this inefﬁciency measure coincides with the
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minus Fenchel conjugate of the revenue function. This result will
later allow us to decompose the revenue inefﬁciency of DMU0 into
technical inefﬁciency and allocative inefﬁciency for any observed
market price p, regardless of whether p belongs to Z0 or not.
Nevertheless, before stating this result, we need to prove a lemma
that will be used later.
Lemma 1. Let ν; μ; α; τð Þ be a feasible solution of (9). Then,
r x0; μ
  Xs
r ¼ 1
μry
0
rr
Xm
i ¼ 1
νix
0
i þα
Xs
r ¼ 1
μry
0
r : ð12Þ
Proof. Using constraint (9.1) in (9), we have that αZ
Ps
r ¼ 1
μry
j
r
Pm
i ¼ 1
νix
j
i for all j¼ 1; :::;n, which is equivalent to
αZ max
j ¼ 1;:::;n
Xs
r ¼ 1
μry
j
r
Xm
i ¼ 1
νix
j
i
( )
: ð13Þ
On the other hand, given input and output prices w; pð Þ, Ray
(2007),p. 233 showed that, under VRS, the proﬁt function4
calculated on T corresponding to these prices can be easily obt-
ained as π w; pð Þ ¼ max
j ¼ 1;:::;n
Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
j
r
Pm
i ¼ 1
wix
j
i
( )
. This implies that
αZπ ν; μð Þ (using (13)). Additionally, Färe and Primont (1995),p. 136
showed that π w; pð Þ ¼ sup
x
r x; pð Þ Pm
i ¼ 1
wixi
( )
. In this way, we have
that αZπ ν; μð Þ ¼ sup
x
r x; μð Þ Pm
i ¼ 1
νixi
( )
Zr x0; μ
   Pm
i ¼ 1
νix0i ,
where the last inequality is true because sup
x
r x; μð Þ Pm
i ¼ 1
νixi
( )
is always greater than or equal to r x; μð Þ Pm
i ¼ 1
νixi evaluated at the
particular point x¼ x0. In this fashion, we have obtained that
αZr x0; μ
  Pm
i ¼ 1
νix0i , which is equivalent to r x
0; μ
 
r Pm
i ¼ 1
νix0i þα
by rearranging terms. Finally, by adding the term  Ps
r ¼ 1
μry0r
 	
to
both sides of the inequality, we get (12).
Now we are ready to prove the desired result:
RIo x0; y0
 ¼ rn x0; y0 : In order to prove the equality, we sepa-
rately prove the two corresponding inequalities.
Proposition 5. RIo x0; y0
 
Zrn x0; y0 :
Proof. On the one hand, seeking simplicity, let us denote as
F ð9Þ the feasible set of program (9). By (9), Ro x0; y0
 ¼
inf
ν;μ;α;τ
Pm
i ¼ 1
νix0i þα
Ps
r ¼ 1
τr : ν; μ; α; τð ÞAF ð9Þ
( )
: Now, we focus on the
term
Ps
r ¼ 1
τr . By constraint (9.2) in (9), we have that τr ¼ μry0r 1s;
r¼ 1; :::; s, which implies that Ps
r ¼ 1
τr ¼
Ps
r ¼ 1
μry0r 1. Replacing
Ps
r ¼ 1
τr
by
Ps
r ¼ 1
μry0r 1, we then have that
Ro x0; y0
 ¼ inf
ν;μ;α;τ
Xm
i ¼ 1
νix
0
i þα
Xs
r ¼ 1
μry
0
r þ1 : ν; μ; α; τð ÞAF ð9Þ
( )
¼|{z}
Takingþ1 out
of the infimum
inf
ν;μ;α;τ
Xm
i ¼ 1
νix
0
i þα
Xs
r ¼ 1
μry
0
r : ν; μ;α; τð ÞAFð9Þ
( )
þ1 3|{z}
Rearranging
terms
RIo x0; y0
 |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼ Ro x0; y0
 1
ðby ð10ÞÞ
¼ inf
ν;μ;α;τ
Xm
i ¼ 1
νix0i þα
Xs
r ¼ 1
μry
0
r : ν; μ; α; τð ÞAF ð9Þ
( )
:
ð14Þ
On the other hand, by Lemma 1, r x0; μ
  Ps
r ¼ 1
μry0r
r Pm
i ¼ 1
νix0i þα
Ps
r ¼ 1
μry0r for all ν; μ; α; τð ÞAF ð9Þ. Then, taking the
inﬁmum on both sides of the inequality, we have that
inf
ν;μ;α;τ
r x0; μ
 Xs
r ¼ 1
μry
0
r : ν; μ; α; τð ÞAF ð9Þ
( )
r
inf
ν;μ;α;τ
Xm
i ¼ 1
νix0i þα
Xs
r ¼ 1
μry
0
r : ν; μ; α; τð ÞAF ð9Þ
( )
¼|{z}
by ð14Þ
RIo x0; y0
 
:
ð15Þ
In this way, we have derived the sign of the inequality we were
seeking. To ﬁnish the proof, we need to show that
rn x0; y0 r(15) since, as we have just shown, (15)rRIo x0; y0 .
To do that, note that the inﬁmum in (15) takes a value greater than
or equal to the same inﬁmum calculated on a set that contains F ð9Þ:
inf
ν;μ;α;τ
r x0; μ
 Xs
r ¼ 1
μry
0
r : min sy
0
1μ1; :::; sy
0
s μs
 
Z1
( )
r
inf
ν;μ;α;τ
r x0; μ
 Xs
r ¼ 1
μry
0
r : ν; μ; α; τð ÞAF ð9Þ
( )
: ð16Þ
This last inequality is true because, by (9.2) and (9.5) in (9), any
ν; μ; α; τð ÞAF ð9Þ satisﬁes y0r μrZ1s; r¼ 1; :::; s3sy0r μrZ1;
r¼ 1; :::; s3 min sy01μ1; :::; sy0s μs
 
Z1 . Finally, (16) is equivalent
to inf
μ
r x0; μ
  Ps
r ¼ 1
μry0r : min sy
0
1μ1; :::; sy
0
s μs
 
Z1
 
since the
only decision variable that appears in (16) is μ and, additionally,
inf
μ
r x0; μ
  Ps
r ¼ 1
μry0r : min sy
0
1μ1; :::; sy
0
s μs
 
Z1
 
¼ inf
μ
r x0; μ
  Ps
r ¼ 1
μry0r : μAZ
0
 
¼ rn x0; y0  (by (11)). This
last step concludes the proof.
Proposition 6. RIo x0; y0
 
rrn x0; y0 :
Proof. Let pARsþ þ and let c
n; dn;ψn
 
be an optimal solution of
model (4). Then,
r x0; p
  Xs
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r ¼
Xm
i ¼ 1
cni x
0
i þψn
 !

Xs
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r ; ð17Þ
4 The proﬁt function is usually deﬁned in the literature as
π w; pð Þ ¼ sup
x;y
Ps
r ¼ 1
pryr
Pm
i ¼ 1
wixi : x; yð ÞAT
( )
(see Färe and Primont, 1995, p. 125).
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since, by duality in linear programming and using (3) and (4),
r x0; p
 ¼ Pm
i ¼ 1
cni x
0
i þψn. In addition,Xm
i ¼ 1
cni x
j
i
Xs
r ¼ 1
pry
j
rþψn Z|{z}
by ð4:2Þ
Xm
i ¼ 1
cni x
j
i
Xs
r ¼ 1
dnr y
j
rþψn Z|{z}
by ð4:1Þ
0: ð18Þ
In this way, cn; p;ψn; δð Þ with pAZ0 and δr : ¼ pry0r ð1=sÞ, r¼
1; :::; s, is a feasible solution of (9) since (9.1) is satisﬁed by (18),
(9.2) by the deﬁnition of δr , (9.3) by (4.3), (9.4) on the assumption
that pAZ0  Rsþ þ and, ﬁnally, (9.5) holds thanks to pAZ0 ¼
pARs : min sy01p1; :::; sy
0
s ps
 
Z1
 ¼ pARs : pry0r Z1=s; r¼ 1; :::;
sg and, therefore, δr ¼ pry0r ð1=sÞZ0 for all r¼ 1; :::; s. Continuing
with the proof, Ro x0; y0
 
r Pm
i ¼ 1
cni x
0
i þψn
Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r þ1 by evaluat-
ing the objective function of (9) at cn; p;ψn; δð Þ. Therefore, Ro x0; y0
 
is a lower bound of
Pm
i ¼ 1
cni x
0
i þψn
Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r þ1 : pAZ0
( )
and
Ro x0; y0
 
r inf
p
Xm
i ¼ 1
cni x
0
i þψn
Xs
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r þ1 : pAZ0
( )
; ð19Þ
since the inﬁmum of a set is the greatest lower bound of the set.
Now, using (15) we replace
Pm
i ¼ 1
cni x
0
i þψn
Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r
 !
by
r x0; p
  Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r
 	
in (19), obtaining Ro x0; y0
 
r inf
p
r x0; μ
 
 Ps
r ¼ 1
μry0r þ1 : pAZ0g. Taking þ1 out of the inﬁmum, we have
that Ro x0; y0
 
r inf
p
r x0; μ
  Ps
r ¼ 1
μry0r : pAZ
0
 
þ1. Finally, by
rearranging terms in the inequality and using (10), we have that
RIo x0; y0
 
r inf
p
r x0; p
  Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r : pAZ
0
 
¼|{z}
by ð11Þ
rn x0; y0 :
Finally, and thanks to Propositions 5 and 6, we have the
following result.
Theorem 1. RIo x0; y0
 ¼ rn x0; y0 :
We have just shown that the Russell output measure
of technical inefﬁciency is dual to the ﬁrm's revenue function.
Speciﬁcally, RIo x0; y0
 ¼ rn x0; y0 ¼ inf
p
r x0; p
  Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r : pA

Z0g. In other words, this result says that if we start with the
revenue function, we can then derive the technical inefﬁciency
associated with the Russell output measure by minimizing
r x0; p
  Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r over Z
0. So, the question at this moment is
whether the inverse result holds, i.e., whether it is possible to
derive the revenue function from the knowledge of the Russell
output measure. By Proposition 4, we know that the answer to this
question is afﬁrmative because the conjugate rnn of rn is the
original r. In this way, we have that
r x0; p
 ¼ sup
y
Xs
r ¼ 1
pryrrn x0; y
 
: yAZ0n
( )
¼ sup
y
Xs
r ¼ 1
pryrþRIo x0; y
 
: yARsþ þ
( )
; ð20Þ
since Z0n ¼ Rsþ þ is the domain of rnn. This result means that we can
recover the revenue function from the Russell output measure. There-
fore, we point out that these types of dual relationships make it easy to
pass back and forth between a revenue approach and a Russell measure
approach when the analysis of the ﬁrm's efﬁciency is the focus.
We now turn to the decomposition of the revenue inefﬁciency
in terms of technical inefﬁciency and allocative inefﬁciency. To do
so, we go on to apply the well-known Young–Fenchel inequality
(Proposition 3) in our context.
Corollary 1. r x0; p
  Xs
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
RevenueInefficiency
Z RIo x0; y0
 |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
TechnicalInefficiency
for all pARsþ and
all y0ARsþ þ such that min sy
0
1p1; :::; sy
0
s ps
 
Z1.
Proof. By Theorem 1, RIo x0; y0
 ¼ rn x0; y0  or, equivalently,
RIo x0; y0
 ¼ rn x0; y0 . By adding r x0; p  to the both sides of
the last equation, we have that
r x0; p
 RIo x0; y0 ¼ r x0; p þrn x0; y0 , which by Proposition
3 is greater than or equal to
Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r for all pAR
s
þ and all
y0ARsþ þ such that min sy
0
1p1; :::; sy
0
s ps
 
Z1. Finally, by rearran-
ging terms we get that r x0; p
  Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r Z RIo x
0; y0
 |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
TechnicalInefficiency
.
Relationships like that shown in Corollary 1 allow the decomposi-
tion of revenue inefﬁciency into its usual subcomponents. The
technical inefﬁciency term appeared in a natural way as a direct
consequence of the theory of Fenchel conjugates, while the other
component, the allocative inefﬁciency, will emerge as a residual
following Farrell's tradition. Before closing the inequality, we would
like to highlight one interesting point. The above inequality is only
valid for market output prices so that min sy01p1; :::; sy
0
s ps
 
Z1. This
seems to be a weakness in contrast to the usual Fenchel–Mahler
inequalities in the literature. Nevertheless, we are able to derive a
new Fenchel–Mahler inequality, satisﬁed by any vector of market
output prices. In particular, this result is possible thanks to one
property of the revenue function: homogeneity of degree þ1 in
prices (see Färe and Primont, 1995, p. 49). Let us show how. Let
pARsþ þ . Then, p= min sy
0
1p1; :::; sy
0
s ps
  
AZ0. Now, by Corollary
1 we have that
r x0; p=min sy01p1; :::; sy
0
s ps
  
Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r
min sy01p1; :::; sy
0
s ps
 ZRIo x0; y0 :
ð21Þ
Finally, by the homogeneity of degree þ1 of the revenue
function, we obtain
r x0; p
  Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r
sU min p1y01; :::; psy
0
s
 |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
NormalizedRevenueInefficiencyðNRIÞ
Z RIo x0; y0
 |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
TechnicalInefficiencyðTIÞ
: ð22Þ
The expression on the left of (22), NRI, provides a measure of
the ﬁrm's revenue lost by not operating in a fully efﬁcient manner.
NRI is really a normalized deviation between optimal revenue,
r x0; p
 
, and observed revenue,
Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r , at market prices, p. In
particular, the normalization that emerges in a natural way from
the duality theory is s, the number of outputs multiplied by the
minimum among the partial actual revenues corresponding to
each output. Thanks to the normalization, it is easy to prove that
NRI satisﬁes a desirable index number property: it is homoge-
neous of degree zero in prices, which makes NRI invariant to the
currency units for the output prices. As Nerlove (1965, p. 94)
pointed out, a non-normalized measure like the NRI numerator
could be considered as being an inappropriate economic measure
due to its homogeneity of degree one in prices. As such, a measure
of this type, which in turn is used as an index number, would be
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inaccurately expressed in nominal money units. Thus, normal-
ization is always needed for these kinds of indexes.
Regarding the properties that NRI should satisfy, Kuosmanen
et al. (2010, pp. 585–586) suggested that “the measure [should be]
homogenous of degree zero in prices and quantities”. As afore-
mentioned, NRI is homogeneous of degree zero in prices. As for
homogeneity of degree zero in quantities (outputs), we are going
to show that NRI meets this property. For the sake of illustration,
let us suppose that we have only one input (x), labor, measured in
hours and only one output (y), corn, measured in tons. Let us also
suppose that p¼$3000 per ton. Now imagine that we want to
change the units of measurement of the output for unit 0, y0. We
particularly want to measure the output in kilograms
y0;new ¼ 1000y0 . This change in the units of measurement, work-
ing in kilograms instead of tons, implies a transformation in p.
Indeed, the new p value, pnew, is $3 (3000/1000) per kilogram. It is
easy to realize that both r x0; pnew
 
and pnewy0;new, measured in $,
take the same original value. Finally,
NRInew ¼ r x
0; pnew
 pnewy0;new
pnewy0;new
¼ r x
0; p
 py0
py0
¼NRI: ð23Þ
In order to ﬁnish this section, we next show how to calculate
allocative inefﬁciency from (22). Inequality (22) can be turned into
equality by including a residual component measuring allocative
inefﬁciency: NRI¼TIþAI5, where
AI¼
r x0; p
  Ps
r ¼ 1
pry
0
r
sU min p1y01; :::;psy
0
s
 
0
BB@
1
CCARIo x0; y0 : ð24Þ
Therefore, NRI can be easily decomposed into technical and
allocative components. We also note that NRI is always greater than
or equal to zero with nil inefﬁciency signaled when it takes a value
of zero. The same interpretations can be given to the technical and
allocative subcomponents. Indeed, NRI satisﬁes the condition that it
is zero if and only if the DMU being assessed achieves maximum
revenue at market prices, an interesting property called indication
in the literature (Portela and Thanassoulis, 2007).
Finally, in the next section, we illustrate our method by means
of a numerical example.
4. Numerical example
This section includes a numerical illustration on the use of the
new methodology proposed in this paper. In particular, we use a
database with 11 DMUs that use one input to produce two outputs
(see Table 1). Seeking simplicity, we have considered that all DMUs
have the same level of input, equal to one. Additionally, we have
assumed that some DMUs produce zero for one of their outputs.
We have avoided the situation where all outputs are zero for the
same DMU since this seems an unusual case. The DEA technology
estimated from the considered data sample is graphically illu-
strated in Fig. 2. As can be seen, DMUs C, D, E and F belong to the
strong efﬁcient frontier. Additionally, we assume that market
output prices are p1 ¼ 1 and p2 ¼ 4. In this way, maximal revenue
is achieved at point C.
Table 1 records, for all the DMUs, the results obtained when we
apply the approach presented in this paper. To be precise, for each
of these units we have reported the value of its input and outputs
in the ﬁrst three columns. The fourth column is the Russell output
measure of technical efﬁciency, i.e., the optimal value of model (8),
denoted as Ro x0; y0
 
. The projection point generated by (8) is
shown in the ﬁfth column. The last three columns correspond to
the normalized revenue inefﬁciency as in (22), the value of the
Russell output measure of inefﬁciency obtained from (10) and the
allocative inefﬁciency component calculated by means of (24).
It is worth mentioning that the Russell measures are well-
deﬁned for evaluating vectors of strictly positive outputs. Other-
wise, several interesting properties of these measures can fail. As
an example, let us focus on the analysis on DMUA. If we use model
(8) to determine the Russell output measure of technical efﬁciency
for this unit, we obtain that the objective function would tend to
þ1. The solution that we consider suitable for this situation
consists of deleting the terms related to outputs with zero from
the objective functions in (3) and (8), restricting the minimum in
(2) over the terms with outputs strictly positive, and changing s by
the number of outputs strictly positive for each assessed DMU.
However, in this case, property (ii) in Proposition 2 is no longer
met. To illustrate this point, note that Ro xA; yA
 ¼ 1. However,
DMU A is a unit that is dominated in the sense of Pareto by DMU B.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that for DMUs A, H, and I, the use
of the Russell measure cannot be completely justiﬁed since Pareto–
Koopmans efﬁciency is not always related to a value of one for this
measure, our results of duality remain true as we pointed out in
footnote 3. Note how for these three units expression (22) holds, in
this case with equality. The equality is due to the fact that, for
example for I, economic inefﬁciency, technical inefﬁciency and
allocative inefﬁciency are measured exclusively with respect to
the second output. For this particular unit, the only source of
inefﬁciency detected is technical, as a consequence of moving from
I to A, and, additionally, there is not allocative inefﬁciency (AI¼0)
and, therefore, NRI¼TI. Anyway, we recognize that the problem of
the traditional Russell measures for dealing with zero values in
inputs and outputs is a limitation that is inherited by our approach.
Nevertheless, this feature has not prevented Russell measures from
recently being successfully applied to different contexts (see, for
example, Lansink and Ondersteijn, 2006; and Mahlberg and Sahoo,
2011) under the assumption of working with nonzero outputs.
Regarding the analysis of the results for DMUs with strictly
positive outputs, we want to point out two things. First, inequality
(22) is satisﬁed for all these units. Second, C is the only revenue
efﬁcient unit (NRI¼0), which implies that it is also technically and
allocatively efﬁcient, whereas D, E, and F are technically efﬁcient
(TI¼0) but revenue inefﬁcient (NRI40), with this inefﬁciency
being purely allocative.
Finally, let us show how an additional property of the original
Russell measure is also inherited in some sense by the proposed
approach. We are referring to the possibility of multiple solutions in
the case of the application of model (8), the non-uniqueness
property. We graphically illustrate this situation in Fig. 2 and
DMU J. For this unit, there are two optimal projections that generate
the same value for the Russell output measure: units D and E.
However, NRI and TI in (22) and AI in (24) have the same value
regardless of the projection selected on the strong efﬁcient frontier.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a new way to measure and
decompose revenue inefﬁciency. Our approach was based on the
5 In contrast to what is usually believed, the Russell output measure of
inefﬁciency RIo x0 ; y0
 
is additive in nature. If we apply the change of variables
ϕr ¼ ðy0r þsþr =y0r Þ ¼ 1þðsþr =y0r Þ, r ¼ 1; :::; s, we get that program (8) is equivalent to
1þ max
sþ Z0;λZ0
1
s
Xs
r ¼ 1
sþr
y0r
:
Xn
j ¼ 1
λjx
j
irx0i ; 8 i; 
Xn
j ¼ 1
λjyjrþsþr ry0r ; 8r;
Xn
j ¼ 1
λj ¼ 1
8<
:
9=
;|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
vn x0 ;y0ð Þ
. In
this way, by (10), we have that RIo x0 ; y0
 ¼ vn x0; y0  and, therefore, the Russell
output measure of inefﬁciency is equivalent to an additive-type measure. The
additive nature of the Russell measures has already been noted by Färe et al. (2007)
and more extensively and formally studied in Fukuyama and Weber (2009).
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output-oriented Russell measure. This fact allowed us to assure
that the technical efﬁciency component accounts for all the
sources of inefﬁciency on the output side, including the output
slacks. Although the input and output oriented versions of the
Russell measure are well known in the literature, as far as we are
aware, this is the ﬁrst approach employing these technical mea-
sures that achieves decomposing overall inefﬁciency.
All our results were derived from a new Fenchel–Mahler
inequality resorting to the application of the theory of convex
conjugates. We particularly demonstrated the existence of a new
dual relationship between the revenue function and the Russell
output measure, in contrast to what is believed by some authors.
Regarding the implications of the results of this paper, we note
two points. From a theoretical point of view, we have been able to
establish a natural dual relationship between the revenue function
and the original version of the Russell output measure; in spite of
the previous multiple unsuccessful attempts to provide such
duality results (see Kopp, 1981, Russell, 1985, Färe et al., 1985
and Färe et al., 2007). From a practical point of view, we also
provide a way of decomposing revenue inefﬁciency into allocative
inefﬁciency and a component that measures technical inefﬁciency
in the sense of Pareto, taking into account all the existing sources
of technical inefﬁciencies (slacks). This feature contrasts with the
usual approaches for decomposing revenue inefﬁciency, such as
those based on Shephard's output distance function (Shephard,
1953) and the directional output distance function (Chambers
et al., 1996, 1998), which ignore the possible existence of slacks
related to the projected points on the production frontier.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that all the results derived in this
paper for the output-oriented Russell measure and the revenue
function can also be obtained for the input-oriented version of the
Russell measure and the cost function.
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